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INTRODUCTION
Cities are eager to bmld rail transR systems In early 1984, over 30 r~l projects were being planned m the Umted States, w~th an estimated cost of over $17 bdhon (Wall Street Journal, 1984 ) t Yet while catles eagerly seek rail prolects, many researchers instead advocate increased rehance on btm transit and more efficient personal transportataon technologaes (Altshuler, 1981 , Homer, 1976 , Lave, 1978 , Webber, 1980 Rml transR ts cnttctzed for high energy use an,rl hzgh capital costs and for being mfenor, m all but the most densely populated areas, to alternatives ba~ed on high-occupancy vehicle (HOV) lanes and dedicated bus lanes. Tl, as study will document why, despite experts' admomshments of perpetual operating deficits and poor performance, local leaden continue to perceive fixed rail transR favorably After ~dentd3nng the values of the local pohtmam that were not g~ven enough weight m the U S. Urban Mass Tranm AdrmmstraUon (UMTA) evaluation Sacramento tranm alternauves, we d~scuss the 1984 changes m the UMTA evaluauon method These changes mcorl:orate local poht~cal support for pro]-ect nnplementaUon into the analys~ The new UMTA procedures also take into account the h~gh degree ot tmcert~unty m ndershtp and other performance pt o]ect~ons
The dectstonmakmg context
Before studying the reasons for the local decmon, t ts useful to understand the pohcymakmg context tl~at permits local officaals to choose rod tranm modes tFor a worldwide summary, see Mass Transit, 1985 m spite of the findings of techmcal agency evaluations Strong potmcal and adrmmstrauve chreetaoñ s lackang on the nauonal level, and ~s dmtorted on the local level by the fragmented planning, fun&rig, and decaslon-makmg process (Altshuler, 1981 , pp 12-13, Ashworth, 1981 , Lewn and Abend, 1971 Natmnal leadership m transit planmng and development has been errauc because of the polycentnc structure of the nauonal government and because of a fundamental behef m, and mstltuuonal rehance on, local choice The plurahsUc and relatively nomdeologlcal national government structure rehes on a continual interplay of interest groups to obtain consensus, resulting m constantly sbafung priorities (cf Altshuler, 1981 , pp 12-14, Wddavsky, 1964 Congress is composed of persons representang states or subareas within states; these representaUves respond to local agendas Executive agencies (e g., UMTA), where the President and his appointees could exercise leaderslup, are generally supervxsed closely by Congressional committees, where members watch out for local interests. As a result, there zs no nanonal transit agenda, and UMTA does not have full control even over the transit grants process ~t tAn example of lack of consistent Ieaderslup and lack of control are illustrated by the foUowmg anecdote On December 4, 1985, Senator Wdham Proxmare gave l~s monthly "Golden Fleece" award to the UMTA Admamstrator for "wasting" $30 bdhon of taxpayer money over 20 years on transit subsidies The Adrmmstrator is reported to have srmhngly accepted vath a remark that the award w~s well deserved, noting, moreover, that it was Congress that had authorized those funds (Enganeermg News-Record, January 9, 1986, p 17) ,*60
Associated vath the fragmentation of the federal government are procedures that earmark funds for particular types of projec~ and programs (Ferejohn, 1974) Accorchng to the Congressional Budget Of. rice, earmarkang of funds prevents evenhanded evaluaUon and selection of alterr~tive transportation modes (C-~O, 1978, pp. 13-15, 22-23) and distorts local planning and dccislon-makmg But even wlthrn one program area, such as transportation, benefit-cost and cost-effectiveness analyses axe hrmted to a small number of measurable variables For example, Mohnng (1965) has set forth a reasonable procedure for optlmmng freeway expenchtures m the United States, but his analys~s ignores the many noneconon'uc costs of freeway construction that have severely curtaded this program (Altshuler, 1981, pp 31--42) t Slmalarly, while urban renewal could sometimes be shown to be fiscally beneficial to cities, it created many social costs, leadmg to its unpopularity (Wdson, 1967, pp 491-582) Nevertheless, many officials and staff members of transit funding agencies place great weight on the results of transit evaluauons and on underlying research. These results are quantitative and seetamgly unambiguous° These sm&es, however, are not made from the viewpoint of the local decision makers Lmstone (1984) critiques purely techmcal approaches to planning and advocates adding orgamzat~onal and personal perspecuves "Decisionmaking inherently mvotves orgamzauons and radio vtdu~Is, whose perspec~ves are very different from those of 'ratmnal' systems analysts or technology assessors." (p 4) * Wachs (1985) states that m "policy 6ebatea" the " techmcally precise enumerations of cost and benefits may be less important than debates about the elements of cost and benefits which should most appropnately be mc|uded wathm a pohcy study " (p 12). He claims that the rational planning and evaluation mode of agency behavior may produce largely irrelevant stuehes and that other modes of analysis and decislon-makang need to be examined BmI&ng on work by AIhson (1971) , Altshuler (1974) , and Lee 0977), Meyer and Miller (1984) advocate a transpormtlon planmng process that recognizes the importance of (I) building concensus among local pohticians and implementing agencies and (2) recognizing the uncertainty of key performance forecasts (pp 85-86) Their process involves the considerauon of impacts of concern to local interest groups, as well as standard efficiency and cost-effectiveness measures (pp 373-378) summary, if project evaluataons were done m a comprehenswe and scientifically vahd manner that ehctted vadespread confidence, then there would be a greater bas~s for agreement between local officials *Dickey has reviewed the hrmtanons of benefit-cost and cost-effecuveness analyses m transponauon evaluauon (1983, pp 343-370) ,Lmstone draws on earlier work by Allison (1971) , who m turn elaborates on work by Simon (1957) and othetS ch©m ), Llkert (1961 ), and Benms (1961 explored the hmRs to rataonal models m orgamzanonal psychology R A JOHUS'rON et al and funding agencies m choosing transit investments. We wflI return to th~s topic at the end of the article
Setting
The city of Sacramento is the capital of Cahforma and the fourth largest metropohtan area in the state Urban development extends from the rich croplands along the Sacramento Raver eastward onto the gently sloping lower foothills of the Sierra Nevada range Urban populatxon was concentrated un~ after World War II in a small incorporated area (Sacramento City) to the south and east of the intersecting American and Sacramento rivers Suburban development soon spread to umncorporated areas m the east and northeast, bordered roughly by two freeways, U S 50 and Interstate 80 Crash and noise unpact zones for two Air Force bases straddhng the area helped to constrain urban use to within this wedge Rapid suburban growth continues in this umncorporated area of Sacramento County. New waves of growth have slowly spread southward and northward from the central city onto prmae agricultural lands. During the 1990s these areas wall receive considerable growth, as wall the urban area to the west, m Yolo County. By the year 2000, then, the metropohtan area will have developed more evenly around the central bustness &strict (CBD).
I-hgh rates of growth are expected m the Sacramento metropohtan area at least through the remainder of the century, stimulated mostly by the growing concentration of "high technology" firms to the east of the city The county population was 783,381 m 1980, and is projected to grow to 1,187,000 people m the year 2000 (Sacramento Area Council of Governments, 1984) Population density is low Even by the year 2000 in the most dense area (between U S 50 and 1-80 where the light rail transit [LRT] project and its feeder buses vall be deployed), population density is not expected to exceed 3,000 persons per square mile, equivalent to less than two dwelling umts per acre (UMTA, 1982) Th~s density ~s much lower than the 9-12 dwelling umts per acre (equivalent to over 20,000 persons per square mile) that Fushkarev and Zupan (1977, p 188) have postulated as the m~m-mum hmR for successful deployment of hght rml transit When transit alternauves were being stud~ed m the late 1970s, Sacramento's central business district contained 78,000 workers, which is relatively high for a metropohtan region of this population, but low compared to crees that already have hght rail systems State government dominates CBD employment, accounting for about 25% of the total (Cahforma Department of General Services, 1977) Approximately 12 million square feet of nonremdenual floor space are concentrated in the CBD Generally, 20 nulhon square feet is considered the rmmmum required to support a single LRT hne when the line ts budt on an unused right-of-way (such as a freeway median or old railroad bed) (Pushkarev and Zupan, 1977, p 161) Pohttcs and techmcal tmccrtamty in transportation investment Parking ts relauvely inexpensive and abundant. Free all-day curb parking can be found within 3 blocgs from the CBD, and 1-and 2-hour and all-day parking meteors with rat¢s of $0 25 per hour are common in the CBD Parking garages generally charge $3 to $5 for all-day parking and $45 to $70 for monthly parking Paved surface lots are less expensive State government workers pay $21-$37 per month for 4,000 spaces Bus serwce in the LRT study area is generally hght, though good express service is provided at peak hours in the 1-80 and U S. 50 comdors The electorate in the region has tended not to support transit services, turnmg down by 56% to 44% m 1979 a proposal to increase the exisrang sales tax from 6 0% to 6 25% to generate revenue for transit services (Scl~uman and Nelson, 1982, p 23 ) t Only about 1 6% of trips m the study area are by transit In contrast, in the similar-sized Calgary area where a new LRT system ts being put in place, 18% of tnps are by transit (Chumak and Bolger, 1984) The major highways generally operate without subt,tantial congestion, experiencing occasional standstills and delays over a penod of one to two hours in each peak penod Population growth ts expected to result in increased delays, but, "the service provided by the [I-80 and U S 50] highways is expected to remain relatively good [in the year 2000] with the slowest segments operating at 2S to 30 mph [dunng peak hours]" (UMTA, 1982, p 5) . in summary, the Sacramento region appears to be unsuited for rail tranm It has low residennal densit~es, plentiful and mexpensive parking m the CBD, and an extensive and relatively uncongested freeway network
LR F h~tory
In the rmd-1970s, concern m Sacramento was gro'~ng over leapfrog development and the role of freeways in encouraging such development In 1974, m response to commumty protests, the County Board of :~upervisors voted to delete three planned but unbuilt freeways In February 1975, a group of raft entlhusiasts and environmental activists formed the Modern Transit Society (MTS), the orgamzauon that wa~, to be the major lobb3qng force for hght rail transit in Sacramento. MTS was phllosopMcally committed to transit (especially raal transit) as Mternattve to freeways (Hultgren, 1984 , Schumann, 1984 The ongmal idea for the LRT system came from an MTS proposal m 1975 to build an historic trolley *At the time, RT was experiencing bus maintenance and overall management problems and its mmage m the press wa~, poor (Personal commumcatlon, James E Roberts, Project Director, Sacramento RT, January 2.5, 1986) pot [ in 1984 showed 45% m favor of a small sales tax mcrease for LRT, far short of the required two-thirds majonty (Sacramento Bee, 1984¢ ) Despite a growing population, daffy transit patronage has dropped from 76,700 m 1981 to 56,000 in 1983 (for vanous reasons such as lower gasoline pnces and sersace cutbacks to meet Cahforma farebo~." return ratio reqmrements) (UMTA, 1983) 461 m the downtown area The City Council heard the proposal on December 11, 1975, and requested on September 9, 1976 that the Sacramento Area Council of Governments (SACOG) study the idea (Sacramento City Council, 1975 , 1976a . Councilmember Connelly and the MTS were enthusiastic; others were cautious and critical (Suttertown Good-Time News, 1976) The Northeast Area Trargsportation Task Force (NETTF), appointed by the city and county to study the need for proposed freeway routes, recommended m August 1976 that the freeways be withdrawn and that funds be transferred from the proposed 1-80 bypass to "light rad tranm systems with extensive feeder bus sersace" (Northeast Area Transportauon Task Force, 1976, p. 2) In September the City Council discussed, but &d not act upon, the NETrF recommendation to drop the bypass and investigate hght rail (Sacramento City Council, 1976 ; see also Sacramento County Board of Supervisors, 1976) Later in 1976, key people m the Calfforma Department of Transportation and SACOG began to take a hard look at alternatives to the 1-80 bypass, perhaps with raft systems m mind (Gtanturco, 1985; gudm, 1985) Thus some of the ideas, plans, and decisions that provided the tmtlal impetus for alternatives studies m the 1-80 corndor appear to have been developed independently of the MTS historic trolley proposal. The Mrs, however, did influence the NETI 'F (Hoffacker, 1985) .
SACOG reported to the Council on September 29, 1977 that their consultant, Wilbur Smith and Associates, had concluded that % hmited scale special purpose CBD trolley" would be pracracable and worth further study (Sacramento City Council, 1977b) Several council members expressed interest in extending the trolley to the suburbs as a commuter hne (Sacramento City Council, 1977b ) By mad-1977 the trolley was developing a wide range of support, but several months later, after the passage m June 1978 of Proposition 13 (which limited local property tax rates), the project was shelved temporarily (Sacramento Bee, 1978b ) It was revived in a different form in August 1978 by Adnana Glanturco, Director of the Cahforma Department of Transportation (Caltrans) Looking to initiate transit projects m Califorma, she offered to help fund a study of the feaslbthty of hght rall transit in the U S $0 corndor (Sacramento City Councal, 1978a , Gtanturco, 1985 , Sacramento Bee, 1978c The city accepted, aware of growing local support (Sacramento City Council, 1978a , Sacramento Bee, 1978 (:I) Both major local newspapers had edltonahzed m favor (Sacramento Bee, 1978a , Sacramento Umon, 1977 , geglonal Transit (RT) had approved, and was later designated lead agency for the study, and a survey by the Regional Transit District showed that 56 9% of the pubhc favored LRT m Sacramento (Sacramento City Councal, 1978b) The League of Women Voters, environmental groups, the Sacramento Chamber of Commerce, and other business and labor orgamzations had spoken m favor of the )ustonc trolley (Sac-ramento C~ty Council, 1977b , Sacramento Umon, 1977 Cal~rarm supported LRT m response to the w~shes of Governor Brown and key state representauves to encocrage tranm and dascourage freeways. Also, Cnantureo had taken much crtucism for the recently eeaablished HOV lanes on the Santa Momca Freeway m Los Angeles (Gtanturco, 1985) . In summary, C.altrans was pushing hard for hght rail, the county was pla)qng a passive role (Colhn, 1985) , serious opposition was ~ackang (Sacramento City Council, 197To, HuRgren, 1985a ) As early as 1978, then, LRT had won tentative support from the pubhc and the key people m power Much of this support was premised on the avmlabihty of federal funds.
Meanwhile, as a result of a series of federal legislaUve acts, beginning w~th the 1973 Federal l~gh-way ACt (see Edner, 1984) , the mstitutlonal mechamsm was in place for diverting funds from approved (but s~l unbmlt) segments of the Interstate Highway system to transit projects The one remaining unbuilt segment in Sacramento m 1975 was a 5 2 mile bypass that was to straighten the ahgnment of Interstate 80 (now Business 80) and increase its capacity In 1978, Caltrans, transit supporters, and envtronmentahsts were successful m convincing the City of Sacramento and SACOG to join with Caltrans to examine altermatives to the planned 5 2 mate freeway ad&tton in the 1-80 corridor The 1-80 Multi-Modal Corridor Study, pubhshed in 1979, pointed out current and expected future deficiencms in the transportaUon system and, w~thout promoting any pamcular sohition, suggested that major transportaUon improvements were needed (Califorma Department of Transportatmn, 1979) .
Meanwhile, the MTS, Caltrans, and others lobbied the City Council, proposing that the roughly $125 nulhon that was "set aside" for the 1-80 bypass (about $25 milhon from the state and $100 mllhon from the federal government) be used instead for tranm in the comdor. In August of 1979 the City Courted voted 8 to 1 to drop the bypass plans and consider alternatives (Sacramento Bee, 1979; Sacramento City Counc~l, 1979b) Shortly thereafter, Caltrans tmtiated the aforementioned light raft feasibility study for the U S 59 comdor, with Regaonal Transit (RT) as the lead agency Cahforma Governor Jerry Brown and Sacramento Mayor Phil Isenberg requested oft January 11, 1980 that the 5 2 male unbmlt interstate segment be deleted, and that the funds be transferred to another unspecified project (Sacramento City Council, 1980a) tTechmcally, the metropoiitan planmng commission (SRAPC, now SACOG) and the Governor had to approve of the deletion, the affected local governments (the cry this case) acted through SACOG (Gmnturco, 1985 , Caltrans, 1979 , p 9, 1978 Surface Transportation Assistance Act) At the insistence of Supervisors Colhn and Sheedy, the county chose not to be actwely revolved m the dectsionmakmg (Sacramento County Board of Supervlsors, 1979a , 1979b According to then-Caltrans Director, Adnana Glanturco, Mayor Isenberg was at first opposed to dropping the bypass She helped change his rmnd
Approval came from UMTA and FHWA four months later Preparauon of a draft environmental impact statemertt (DEIS) was began immediately At about th~ tame, the etty and county endorsed the U S 50 comdor hght raft feasihihty study (Sacramento City Councd, 1980b; 1980d , Sacramento County Board of Supervlsors, 1980a , wbach had concluded that hght raft transit would be a "feasible and desirable" solution to expected problems m the Highway 50 corridor (Sacramento Regmnal Transit Dtstnet, 1980, p 85) . One month later, m June of 1980, the City Council accepted Glanturco's proposal to include both corridors, Interstate 80 and Highway 50, m the DEIS (Sacramento City Council, 1980c Sacramento Umon, 1980a) The DEIS evaluauon was influenced strongly by local interests, but was organized along normal UMTA hnes. Released in April 1981, the DEIS (UMTA, 1981) analyzed a set of transportation alternatives for the two corridors The document served not only as a draft EIS, but also as the feasibility study The alteraativ,s were analyzed largely m terms of anUe~pated impacts and pefform,~ee m the year 2000. The following proposaL% a set somewhat reduced from tho,e ~den-ufied m the earher corndor studies, were examined:
1 No Build--To hold the current street and highway and bus systems stat~c (while the Sacramento area populauon rises an estmmted 30%-40% by the year 2000 [Sacramento Area Council of Governments, 1984] ) Buses would be upgraded, for a cost of $42 nulhon The total capital cost with related manor ro~tdway improvements was $72 milhon.
2 TSM~To hold the basic road system staUc, but to more than double the bus fleet from 229 to 481 buses, and to institute a transportation systems management (TSM) prod'am that would include such measures as freeway on-ramp metering, traffic signal taming, parking fee increases, and turmng lane improvements. Capital costs for buses were $53 mllhon and the total cost was $137 milhon 3 HOV~To include, m adchtion to the above TSM actions, high occupancy vehicle (HOV) lanes that would be separated from normal traffic Roughly 14 males of new HOV lanes would be constructed m the 1-80 and U S 50 corridors, and some crusting lanes set aside on connecting surface streets to improve flow between the freeways and the CBD These lanes would be available only to buses, vanpools, and cars with three or more occupants The bus fleet size would also be more than doubled, from 229 to 474 (a slight reduction m number from the TSM proposal, the difference being justified by the faster travel speed allowed by the HOV lanes, which improves fleet efficiency) Bus costs were $52 nulhon and total capital costs were prelected to be $182 mdhon 4 LRT--In addition to the above TSM actions, to construct an 18 8 mile U-shaped light rail transit route that would run through an exlsung downtown and encouraged tocat involvement m the decision, even though Caitrans "could have rammed the withdrawal through Governor Brown's Office" (Gtanturco, 1985) pedestnan mall, along urban artenals m both exclusive lanes and m~xed traffic, along exclustve nghtof-way already purchased for the deleted 1-80 bypass, and on hghfly used (but not yet purchased) right-of-way owned by the Southern Pac~c Railroad along U S. 50. Trams would operate on 15 rmnute headways with three-car trm~ an the 1-80 comdor, and two-car trams on the U S 50 segment of the route. The extra cars would be uncoupled, stored, and recoupled tn downtown Sacramento as the trmns passed from one corndor to the other There were to be 28 stauons, 17 of them simple platforms, and l0 with purging lots to accommodate a total of about 6,270 velucles Stx "umed-transfer" stations were to be incorporated into a redesagned bus route system so that feeder buses would arnve at the stanonsjust before the trmns departed The bus fleet would be increased from 229 to 397 buses The LRT system itself was to be constructed w~th just $6 6 mflhon from local sources (the c~ty, county, and regmnal Iranstt dmnct), $25 9 rmlhon from the state, and $98.5 aulhon from the federal government t In addmon, buses would cost $43 milhon and related )roadway ~mprovements another $62 rmlhon, for ~:otal capital cost of $232 rmlhon
The rema~mng six alternauves were various combmauons of the TSM, HOV, and LRT proposals, for example hght raft m the Io80 comdor and TSM m the U S 50 corndor The HOV and LRT alternaUves would have used all of the federal money, e~ther for those projects alone, or together w~th related transportatmn infrastructure tmprovements
The DEIS was followed m June 1981 by SACOG's "Preferred Alternative Report" as reqmred by UMTA (SACOG, 1981) L~ght rad was selected and endorsed by the city councd (Sacramento C~ty Council, 1981c) , county supervisors, and regional tranm board The LRT alternauve was selected desptte the fact that the proposed LRT project was expected to serve only a small proporuon of tranm passengers, and thus would stall reqmre a large bus fleet In contrast, the HOV proposal would have met the projected transportaUcm demands w~th a much smaller capttal cosL and would have required no raft hnes and only 474 buses--just 77 more than the LRT alternatwe The selection of the LRT proposal was jusufied m part by such weak ctalms as" "[LRT was] one of the two most efficmnt," "close to the top," "m the top group," and "one of the top two "Other tin December, 1985, the $131 million LRT system was nearly completed and the actual costs were $100 7 mflhon federal, $28 9 mflhon state, and $30 9 mflhon local Of tins $159 5 nalhon, $1 53 mdhon came from private landowners for joint developments near stations About $8 mflhon m State funds and $2 m~on m federal funds were gamed m 1982-1985, dunng prolect engmeenng and construcuon, for radroad crossings, freeway ramps, and local street improvements assocmted w~th LRT The local share mcreased dramaucaUy to cover cost runups encountered dunng the engmeenng design phase The cmty added $22 mdhon m redevelopment (tax-increment bond) funds (Sacramento C~ty Count, 1985) In January 1987, the total cost was $169 m~Hlon 463 jusaficaUons were. "[LRT is] most hkely to improve air quahty [and is] least dependent on petroleum" (SACOG, 1981, p 27) The Sacramento Transit Development Agency, a local joint powers agency created m March 1981 (Sacramento Qty Council, 1981a) to ~mplement the locally preferred LRT alternative, spent the next two years developing the Final EIS for the project and seeking funding comnntments from UMTA and the Cahforma Transportation Comn~sslon (CTC), the state's transportauon pohcy body Staff members from SACOG, UMTA, and the CTC ratsed a w~de range of ob~e~ons (dealt vath below), They quesuoned the w~sdom of funding such a cap~tal-mtensive fixed gmdeway prolect m low-denmy Sacramento, pointed out design deficienczes m the system ttself, and criticized the methods and conclusions of the DEIS. Still, tesUmony and statements by interest groups and individuals at heanngs and m both local newspapers were consistently an favor of LRT (Hultgren, 1984 , 1985a , 1985b , ConneUy, 1984 , Colhn, 1985 Sacramento Union, 1980b , 1985 , Sacramento Bee, 1978a Sacramento City Council, 1977b , 1979a , 1981d . At the August 28, 1979 meeting of the City Council, most of the three dozen ciuzen speakers opposed constructing the 1-80 bypass and supported the hght rml alternatwe (Sacramento City Council, 1979b) . Two years later, on June 16, 1981, when the Council selected LRT as the preferred alternative, a lopsided majonty endorsed the dcaslon (Sacramento Qty Counal, 1981b , 1981d UMTA staff members and administrators, in sptte of thetr objecuons to the hght rml system, could not withhold funding. Interstate transfer funds are wewed as an "enmlement," and proposals to spend them are not subject to the same standards as normal projects In response to pressure from Sacramento's Congresstonal representatives who sought the huge reflux of federal dollars into thexr d~smcts (Fazm, 1984) , Congress earmarked funds m UMTA's FY 1983 budget for the construcUon of the LRT system The only posmon left for UMTA was to msast that no addanonal funds, beyond the approximately $100 malhon available from the Interstate Transfer Program, would ever be g~ven to the Sacramento LRT starter system for capital costs § A s~rmlar approach was taken by the CTC In spite of Comm~ssioner Walter IngaUs' comment that hght ratl "~s the wrong system, m the wrong town, at the wrong ume" (Fltzpatnck, 1983) , the state share funding was provided The federal grant was so large in proportion to the state's share that no one at the CTC wanted to be responsible for losing it Lake UMTA, the CTC ultxmately had to approve funding, and be samfied w~th going on record that no adds-,SACOG staff opposed the btased assumpuons m the DEIS and lost the argument The FEIS work was asslgned to STDA §We note here that the "federal" interstate funds come primarily from gasohne taxes, pa~d by users of freeways R A JOHNSTON e~ a/ (CTC, 1983a) .
LRT had only one remaining procedural hurdle to clear approval of the final EIS by UMTA, which was aecomphshed in August 1983 Despite the cnttcasm of LRT from the funding agencaes' staffs, the final EIS was httle changed from the DEIS released two years earher, particularly in its failure to show that the proposed system was superior to the other alternatives except for "urban development potential" and "year 2000 operating and maintenance costs" (UMTA, 1983, ExMb~t 2°23) (see Table 1) The issue of concern here is not federal funding allocation procedures, however, but rather the overwhelmmg local political support which was at odds with the CTC and UMTA techmcal evaluations In Sacramento, the allure of uncondmoned federal money certainly influenced local choices,, but that tWe note that aa FEIS does not legally have to have the text changed to mclude discussion of comments on the DEIS and the agency's responses to the comments These two sections may be appended to the DEIS text We also note that the role of an EIS ts not to show that the proposed project is supenor, but merely to document the impacts of the proposed project and the alternatives ,Sacramento Mayor Isenberg reminded the C~ty Council m June of 1980 that "we have the chance to glom on to as much money as we can, federal and state" (Isenberg, 1980) County Supervisor Illa Colhn, and SRAPC's Mike Hoffucker at a 1979 board meeting emphasized that "we must act qmcldy and get out an EIS by the deadline or else we could lose tt all we could lose all the funds" (Sacramento County Board of Supervisors, 1979b) (See also CTC 1983b, p 10, "The state does have an opportunity to caplure a very substantial federal grant for Cahforma", UMTA, 1982 , p 2, Isenberg, 1984 , Shore, 1985 , "We get a rauo of four or five dollars to every dollar the City puts m It's still a good deal for the City", and Rudm, 1985) money could have been spent on the HOV alternative Some dec~slon makers dld not seriously consider the HOV option in the analysis of alternatives (Gianturco, 1985 , Colhn, 1985 , and among those who did, most were extremely skeptical of the attract~veness and produetiwty of HOV lanes and bus transit (Glantureo, 1985 , CoUm, 1985 , Johnson, 1985 , Hultgren, 1979 , Sacramento Regional Transit District, 1981 , Sacramento Umon, 1981 , Sacramento Bee, 1980a , 1980c 
ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES
Results of the analysis of Sacramento LRT, conducted as part of the Final EIS (UMTA, 1983) are presented in Table 1 The fourth column indicates, for the two comdors, whmh alte~attve ranked best for each selected indicator (based on oblecnves of low cost, diversion of raps to transit, etc ) The third column presents the value for the light rail alternative, and the second column presents the range of values for the full set of alternatives Light rail was not rated as the best alternative except according to one indicator year 2000 O&M cost But even accordmg to this operating cost criterion, ~t was superior only on an aggregate basis That is, while the EIS asserted that the light rail system would require the smallest operating budget of all the alternatwes~ on a per passenger basis the HOV option was supenor~because the HOV option would carry more transit passengers than the LRT According to nil other criteria--including reductmns m peak-period trip times, reducuons in CBD parking, energy saved, total cost per passenger tnp, total transit trips, and, of course, capital cost--LRT Pohncs and techmc~ uncertainty m transDortanon investment was found to be inferior to the HOV and TSM alternatives, and in many cases, far inferior
In spite of tbas poor showing, the Final EIS (FEIS) maintained that, 'ht is zmportant to keep m perspecuve what as being purchased When more exclusiv~ty [m nght-ofoway] ts provided, transit can fur, ction more reliably, thus increasing its attractweness to potenUal patrons The capital expendltures assocaated with
[LRT] will purchase 18 8 miles of exclusive transitway, compared to 14 7 males for [HOV], a difference of 28 percent " (UM'rA, 1983, p 2-38) This "exclusivity" argument plus the lower absolute operating costs of LRT were the mare reasons used in the EIS to justify LRT's designation as the preferred alternative nl,~t, se$ The poor showing of LRT in the evaluation should have been even worse The assumptions and strnclucre of the analysts were slanted decidedly in favor of the LRT alternative by the local analysts who fo)rmulated the alternatives and conducted the evaluations, using UMTA's format and criteria
In several cases, the non-LRT alternatives were made to seem less attractive First, the expanded bus fleets used to constitute the HOV and TSM options were scaled upward in direct proportion to forecasted population growth This upward scaling was not done selectively to provide higher levels of serrate where demand was expected to be greater, and lower levels where demand would be less Costs, revenues, and rtdership were simply extrapolated into the future Thus the HOV, and espectaUy the TSM, alternatives perform re[anvely poorly on a cost basis (for instance, m terms of cost per passenger) because of an assigned oversupply of buses m many areas (The forecasted performance of the LRT options also suffer from this biased assumption, but to a lesser extent because they include fewer buses ) UMTA staff, commenting on the DEIS, stated that by not expanding bus service selectively " to an appropnate level using loading standards apphed consistently to all alternatives, [the] result is a TSM alternative that ts mefficaent in its design as well as m its performance" (UMTA, 1982, p 14) The TSM alternative designed for the DEIS was never reformulated A proper alternative that reflected the ptuIosophy of TSM would rate far better than the one formulated for the DEIS and FEIS Another source of bias was the factor used to annuahze operating costs The FEIS multiplied the estimated dady cost of TSM and HOV bus operations by 322 to annuahze the costs But for LRT opera°l ions it multiplied daily costs by only 290 UMTA, commenting on the DEIS, noted that the 322 factor may be appropriate for local bus service, but not the egpress bus service which LRT intended to largely replace and which would not operate on weekends Consequently the annual cost of express bus service was overstated If the factor applied to express bus service m the HOV option were changed to 290, the same as that used for LRT, the projections of annual 465 HOV operating costs would decrease about $2 rmlhon (UMTA, 1982, p 9) This error was acknowledged in the DEIS (p 3-94) and FEIS (p S-2, footnote) but was not incorporated into the FEIS analysis t If the figure for HOV operating costs was adjusted, then HOV aggregate operating costs would be lower than those for LRT, and the HOV alternanve would then be superior to LRT by every techmeal mdicator
The Cahforma Transportation Comnusston (CTC) identified other local biases in the analysis of alternatives The CTC asserted that unreasonable assumpuons resulted in an underestimation of operating costs for LRT (CTC, 1983b) For instance, the Sacramento LRT operating cost estamate is only $4 74 mflhon for the first full year of operations m F'Y 1986, while the San D~ego Trolley, wath a shorter hne, fewer vehicles, actual ndership only 55% of that estimated for Sacramento, high utihzation (an average farebox return ratio of 84% in 1981 and 1982) , and a reputauon for frugality, had a 1983 operating budget of $4 5 malhon (CTC, 1983b, p 8) Thus, one is led to suspect that the overall operating budget for Sacramento LRT was understated.
The estimate of admamstrataon costs also appears to be greatly understated The projected FY 1986 budget for Sacramento LRT (not mcludmg buses) provided $4 42 mdhon for fleet operauons, but only $0 32 malhon (6.75%) for admimstration In contrast, the average budget share for admamstration for all light rail operators in the Umted States runrung 25--49 vehicles was 20 2% (U S DOT, 1982), suggesting that the $0 32 malhon admmastratton e.sttmate may have been understated by as much as a factor of three The CTC also noted other unrealistic elements in LRT's projected operating cost, including an understatement of labor costs Indicative of the mampulation of the analysis was the projection in the DEIS that LRT daily ndersMp would be 28,000, a figure criticized by UMTA (1982) as unrealistically high and only reluctantly reduced by the Sacramento Transit Development Agency (STDA) to 20,500 The lower figure was resisted STDA (though adopted in the FEIS) with the argument that, "adoption of tfus estimate would result m a conchtion of no transit ndershtp growth between 1982-83 and 1985-86 It ts virtually inconceivable that this could occur in an urban area where population is growing by 2 5-3 0 percent annually, but no more freeways are bemg built, downtown employment is grovang faster than new parking spaces are being constructed, and parking costs in the downtown are increasing" (UMTA, 1982, p 2-31) Yet elsewhere in the FEIS it is noted that daily bus patronage m the Sacramento area decreased from 76,700 t" [We] assume 322 equivalent working days per year for the bus system The number tmphclt in the LRT estimate-290 days~would also be appropriate for express bus operauons Thus the total annual bus costs are somewhat overstated, especially for the all-bus alternanves" (UMTA, 1983, p S-2, emphasis 
Potenaal design flaws
Apart from the weak justdicatmn for LRT, there are other reasons to doubt the viabthty of the prop ect, mostly having to do with excessive cost skimping To gain approval for the LRT project, Sacramento was forced to agree that all starter system costs in excess of the federal and state contributions would have to be borne 100% by the local area (CTC, 1983a) . As a result, the proposed LRT system for Sacramento was designed to rmmrmze capital costs so that Interstate transfer funds would cover most of the construeuon costs The resulting no-fnUs, costcutting approach to the project was apparently-encouraged by local pohtze~ leaders to make the prop ect more palatable financially to the cry, county, and state This approach threatens LRT's success.
For example, the approved project is largely single tracked (about 60%) Single track operation, with six sidings for passing, reqmres strict adherence to the operating schedule by all trams in order for the system to operate efficmnfly, which greatly threatens system rehabthty It also reqmres that headways be no less than 15 minutes in the Sacramento system, a fairly low level of servace, though probably adequate to meet the low tmUal demand forecasted for the system The entire system could be paralyzed by eqmpment maffuncuons, or excessive dwell tm~e at one stauon by one trmn, for instance to accommodate disabled passengers or because of manor mishaps In areas with mxxed traffic, conflicts with motor vehicles and the possibility of traffic accidents further reduce rehabth~ and threaten dtsrupUon (UMTA, 1982) The recently opened San Diego LRT was ongmally intended to be largely single tracked, but before operation began, double tracking was mtUated (made possible by a state funding windfall lobbied for by a local state legxslator)
Choices of route location are further mdicauons of cost skimping To take advantage of inexpensive nghts-of-way (some already in pubhc ownership), the system uses routes on the periphery of Sacramento's densest suburban areas Indeed, both LRT lines are located along freeways (Business 80 and U S 50) away from the wedge of dense population The advantage of these route locations is lower land costs, the disadvantage ts greater inconvenience for potential riders in reaching the stations It may be that long-term viability ts being traded for short-term construction cost savings "t
Overall evalua#on of Sacramento LRT
A technical re-evaluatlon of costs and performance of Sacramento LRT, using standard transit R A ,IOHNS'rOr* et aL evaluauon procedures, reveals a prolect that apparently has httle to recommend it into the foreseeable future It is a fixed gtudeway prolect located m a low-density metropohtan area superimposed upon an automobile-dominated transportaUon system°B ecause of its penpheral routing, patrons will generally have to use two modes to reach the CBD, travelhng to LRT stauons by car or bus and then transfemng to LRT trams LRT patrons will therefore suffer meonvemence and long total trip umes Given the existence of a high-quahty, relatively uncongested freeway network, the proposed, stogietracked LRT system is not hkely to attract a large ndershtp.
From a cost standpoint, Sacramento LRT appears to be a barely supportable project Its high capital cost makes it one of the least desired of all alternatives, when considered from a societal perspecave Even from the standpoint of a local resident, an unbiased convenuonal cost analysis would show the LRT prolec~ to be shghtly inferior to the HOV option. And tf an efficient bus-based TSM option had been formulated, LRT hkely would be mfenor to that opuon as weU, even on an aggregate operating cost basra.
The LRT option, as indicated earlier m Table I , will perform badly according to other noncost evaiuauon cntena. It is somewhat inferior to the HOV option in saving energy, reducing CBD parking demand, reducing travel tunes, and increasing tranmt patronage LOCAL PE~PECT~E Clearly, the LRT option was not selected on the basis of convenuona[ evaluation ctatena Indeed, the manipulation of the feasibihty study (DEIS) mdlcares that LRT was probably preselected Why, then, did decision makers settle on LRT, even before the offiaal altemauves analysis9 What factors, other than technical criteria, were important in the decision 9 Were these other factors defensible0 We have tdentiffed five types of local concerns that superseded the findings of the agency evaluations i Earmarked state and federal funds HOV was ehglbie for the $100 rmlhon in federal funds, but not the $25 mllhon m state funds, which were reserved for "exclusive gmdeway" projects (UMTA, 1983, pp 2-14, Sacramento Regional Transit Dlsmct, 1981, p 20) Thus local officials would have foregone $25 million if they had chosen HOV over LRT Not only did the Governor and Caltrans director favor LRT, but so did State funding legislation * Furthermore, the TSM and HOV alternatives would not have spent all of the federal transfer funds (the TSM alternatives would have spent $34--$6i rral-*Pdght-of-way acquisition costs, including the mamtenanee shop, LRT vehicle storage yards, and parking at stations, were only 11% of the total project costs (Roberts and Kershaw, 1985 , p 5)~:
Pagid disbursement procedures that target particular transportation modes and projects are a larger problem distorting transportation investment For a discussion relatwe to airport planning, see Six (1973) Pohncs and techracal uncertainty m tra~portanon investment hon ,Lad the HOV altemalaves only about $73 mflhon dire~y on the HOV buses and roadways [UMTA, 1981 , Table S-4, Sacramento Regional Transit D~-tnct, 1981 ). The other momes could have been spent on other transportation prolects, howeveẼ ven if they preferred the HOV alternauve, local offi¢lals perceived that from a game-playing perspective they could max~m~e their gain of federal and state momes by opting for LRT now, since future state and federal funding would most likely not be available for LRT, but would be for HOV The decision was important because most grants to local governments do not perrmt local choice of modes Indeed, HOV |anes and stauous could be built later in increments, adding to their chances for future funding and, indeed, local decision makers and interest groups did expect that, in any case, HOV lanes would be bruit later (Hagedorn, 1984, Connelly, 
1984).+ 2 Perceived lower operanon and maintenance cos,~s for LRT
/mother explanation of support for LRT m Sacramento is rooted in the growing deficit m transit operating costs and the growing reluctance of local, staI:e, and federal governments to cover those deft¢m The federal government is dismchned to conan~e provxdmg operating subsidies, the Reagan ad~mmstranon has sought to elmunate them completely In Cahforma, operating subsidies are capped by statutory restriction, transit operators must cover a specified percentage of operating costs with fare revenues (about 28% in Sacramento) to be ehglble fo~ operatang subsidies Many operators, including the Sacramento Regional Transit D~stnct (which operates buses and has recently assumed respousihihty for the LRT hne) are having great difficulty meeting that threshold Sacramento RT views LRT as an m~egral component of its strategy to mcrea~ the farebox-return ratio As do most transit operators, RT expects their rail service to have lower operating costs per passenger than bus, mostly because of its lower ratio of dnvers to carrying capacity, and therefore to have a higher farebox-retum ratio Sacramento RT already has begun restructunng the route network to facthtate feeder senace when LRT ~s completed It ts widely expected that the substitution of LRT lines for buses will reduce operating defiots (UMTA, 1983; Isenberg, 1984 , Connelly, 1984 , Johnson. 1985 , Colhn, 1985 , Sacramento City Council, 1981d , Sacramento Umon, 1980b in fact, Regional Transit's avowed fmancxal mabihty to operate and maintain the number of bases reqmred by the HOV option was instrumental m convincing many decision makers that LRT was the only feasible al-*67 ternatlve (Hultgren, 1985b (Hultgren, , ffohnson, 1985 The board continually underscored the lower operataon and maintenance costs of LRT, urging that, "O & M costs are the bottom line" (Johnson, 1985) , and "the O & M statistics favonng LRT over HOV are so obvmus that you wonder why anybody would have trouble understanding them" (Sacramento Bee, 1980b ) ~:
We suspect that these presumed cost savings may be illusory because maintenance costs for LRT, with its more spectahzed and complex maintenance reqmrements, wall hkely be higher on a unit basts than stated Hamer (1976) reviews studies of transportation costs, and concludes that rail transit has higher total and O&M costs than autos or express buses on busways, for oneway, peak*hour line volumes of up to 12,000 passengers (pp 36--43 and 57-58) Articulated buses increase the cost advantage for buses up to peak-hour oneway volumes of 20,000 (Hamer, 1976, p 51) The point, however, is that local conventional dora, based on biased assumptions, held that LRT would have substantially lower operating costs than buses
We do not condone the fudging of assumptions as was done by the STDA staff m the DEIS § Correcting the year 2000 total O&M cost prolectmn ts illuminating If we add $2 trulhon to account for the too-low days-per-year factor used, as acknowledged m the DEIS (p 3-94), and we add $0 5 rmllion project a reasonable administration cost (both items were crmctzed by the CTC [1983b] ), the LRT figure nses from $50 5 tmlhon to $53 mflhon The new, more realistic prediction is only about 5% higher and the O&M projections for all of the alternalaves are still within a 5% range This difference is clearly within the range of error for such projections Proper representatmn of these projections would have made the fudging unnecessary, by showing that the alternatives were mdtstmgmshable on this measure We believe that the City Council did not take the O&M cost estimates too seriously, however, in spite of the complaints by the CTC and by UMTA, because of perceived hmitatlons to the techmca] evaluation, in general
Perceived evaluation shortcom,ngs that shght LRT
Local decision makers pointed out that given the uncertainty of technical analyses, they vaewed LRT as at least techmcalty comparable to HOV This atmude was remarkably umform across all local officials we mtervtewed In fact, m every case local of. ficlals, as well as local planners, argued that techmcal evaluations are inherently b~ased against rail transit They claimed that evaluations do not give enough ?There ts some evidence that the Army Corps builds le,,s-efficmnt dams before tt builds more-efficient ones in nver basins, in order to maximize total project expenditures in the long run (Regev and Lee, 1975) Sacramento officials seemed to be strategazmg in this way ,Private O&M costs for HOV (autos) were not accounted for (Roberts, 1986) §We are unable, and unwilling, to determine tf the local elected officials directed the STDA staff to fudge the O&M assumptions 468 weight to LRT benefits such as ehmmation of dmsel smoke at street level, shghtly reduced freeway noise, reduced traJ~fic congestion m the CBD, and focusing of urban g~wth. A w~despread feeling existed in Sacramento that the state and federal transportauon agency st~f~ were biased agmnst rid transit ThenMayor Iscnberg beheved "the reds were more interested tn buses and the CTC ts oriented to freeways" (Sacramento Bee, 1984a) John Schuman, the then-executive chrector for STDA, pointed out that any analysis of transit alternatives will revolve a local predilection for light rail, because UMTA only requires an evaluation of alternatives when the local officials desire a rail system (UMTA staff members demed this) Furthermore, Schuman beheves that local planners vmw the UMTA staff members aa biased in favor of buses and HOV (Schuman, 1984) For example, the HOV cost estimates omitted private parkmg costs for cars and vans in the CBD (Roberts, 1986) Overall then, the local community was highly skeptical of the findings of any evaluation study.
Rtdershtp Local decision makers argue that evaluations of rail transit also do not take into account the supenor ndersh~l>generatmg characteristics of raft transit (Schumann, 1984 , Glanturco, 1985 , Colhn, 1985 , Johnson, 1985 , Connetly, 1984 , Ru&n, 1985 Caltrans Director Glanturco, Cotmalman and ex-Reglonal Transit Board Member Johnson, and Supervisor Colhn all stated w~thout hemaUon that they believed the pubhc was much more likely to nde in trams than in buses or carpoo|s Indeed, Schumann noted that a 10% increment to transit patronage was added to modeled forecasts for the Portland LRT system to account for rail translt's "elusive mystique," but that UMTA disallowed that factor for Sacramento Given the poor demonstrated ability to forecast ndership on new rail transit systems m North Amenca, reliance on point estimates to distingu|sh among alternatives seems unwise t"
Land use efficzency Many local planners and officials felt the evaluation was flawed because it failed to consider rail tranm's ability to guide urban growth (see also Cervero, 1984) Rail transit is permanently fixed, it provides the structure for future clustered development around the stations Bus transit and freeways do not offer those advantages, they argue /'We compared nderslup projections with actual ndero ship tn the first stabilized year for new rall translt systems m North Amenca The results for our incomplete data set, are [(actual-projected) /pro~ected] Miami Metrorad, -89%, San Francasco BART, -41%. Calgary LRT, -3 I% Cleveland LRT, -13%, Ba[tlmore HRT, + 5%, Edmonton LRT, + 13%, and San Diego LRT, + 17% We observe that the errors are large and tend toward overprolectmg r~dershap Since most of the other performance measures are partially determined by projected ndership, traasR evaluation seems uncertain Perhaps evaluation under a range of ndershap values would yield more useful results We cou|d not find an ex post analysis, such as this, in any transit planning text or journal, or in UMTA publications Apparently system proponents and agency reviewers do not systematically learn from pnor expenence R A JOHNSTON et ad Freeways encourage auto use and sprawling development, while bus transit does not grade urban growth because it ts not a fixed and rehable service which prospective developers and employers can treat aa given in their decision to site high-density residential developments, offices, and factones (although one can ~magme creative urban governments that might contractually guarantee a certain level of bus service to a prospective developer or employer for perhaps 20 years or more) City Councilman and ex-Regmnal Transit Board Member Grantland Johnson asserted that, "if we want rational use of land, we have to have fixed systems" (The Sacramento Observer, 1982) ," and that" fixed guideway systems affect growth patterns" (Johnson, 1985) Long-nine LRT study cornrmttee member Anne gudm, Sacramento's current Mayor, averred that "hght raft transit will help us plan for growth" (Sacramento Umon, 1985) . County Supersnsor llla Colhn, "interested in controlhng long-term growth," beheved that LRT would better affect land use than any other option, and even claimed that the county opened the I-hghway 50 corridor for development in expectation of light ra~l there (Colhn, 1985) . City councdman Roberts, at a 1978 hearing on the feaslbihty of the h~stonc troUey, suggested that LRT would be the most growthchrectmg transportation alternative (Sacramento City Council, 1978b) , a notion apparently shared by most of his fellow pohey makers Although research is inconclusive, if not skeptical, of raft trans~t's growthmanaging abihtle$, many local planners and officials felt otherwtse, reducing the credibility of the report in their eyes,, ,In general, arguments that raft transit w~ cause clustering of new urban land uses near smtmns have been shown to be weak, w~th one clear excepnon uses wuhm CBDs do tend to locate near the stauom Uses do not appear to cluster near stattous outside the CBD, however, and there do not appear to be shafts of growth from outside the CBD to reside (Altshuler, 198I, pp 399-400~ Johnston and Tracy, 1983, Kmght and Trygg, 1975) Crees in the Umted States with rail transit actually have below-average growth rates (Hamer, 1976, p 14) But these generahzations may not apply to the Sacramento case Sacramento County rescinded three unbuilt interstate and state highway segments dunng the 1970s Freeway congestion could become a problem before the year 2000 and force growth into the CBD The CBD is the center of California's state government offices and the state has committed to a pohcy of keeping the offices there t C,~hfornia Department of General Services and State Architect's Office, 1977) Some local planners expect the light rail system to serve the state's employees qtate weLl (Hoffacker, 1984 ) Pushkarev etal (1982 assert that Sacramento ~s a 'possible candidate" for light rail, since ~t has a relatively large CBD and unused rights-of-way X'uchic (1981) claims (with some evidence) that rail transit increases ndershap m any urban corridor, due to high level of service and visibility (pp 84-86) also believes that rail transit bnngs about efficient land use patterns and that LRT can be appropnate m clues of 200,000-300,000 population (pp 462-465) City officials certainly expect the LRT system to enhance the CBD, otherwise they would not have conmbuted an additional $22 million m redevelopment funds A rejuvenation of the dying K Street pedestrian mall ~s foremost among the hopes Upgrading of two neighborhoods on the [-80 line is also ex-
Pohucs and technical uncertainty m transportauon mvesunent
E~vzronmentaleffects Envzronmental acnv~sts also felt the evaluauon was flawed m not treating enwronmental and energy benefits adequately Although the actu~ benefits may be small or nonenstent, except m the CBD, the deployment of real tranm was expected by offioals and the pubhc to lower mr pollution and reduce energy consumpnon by chvertmg trips away from autos and express buses and by relying on "cleanly" generated electricity rather than petroleum fuels In 1979, dunng the second great energy crunch, many decision makers w~shed to avoid selecung petroleum-using tramxt projects, not only out of a concern for ear quahty (bus exhaust was thought to be especially obnoxious), but m the interests of "energy independence" as well (Hoffacker, 1984 , Coilm, 1985 , Sacramento CRy Council, 1981d , Hultgren, 1984 , Modern Tranm Soaety, 1978 , Sacramento Umon, 1981 , 1985 , Sacramento Bee, 1978a , Rudm, 1985 . Although the energy and ear quahty benefits will be neghglble at ~-st with LRT, the w~despread percepuon to the conlrary, even among planners, further reduced the credlbthty of the techmcal evaluanon ?
4~7~e permanence and glamor of LRT L~3cal decision makers also preferred LRT because of ~t~ permanence (Isenberg, 1984 , Johnson, 1985 C~ltm, 1985) . Large costs sunk into a fixed system would likely r~cessttate continuing support and perhap~, even improvements, such as double-trackang and ad&uonal routes In fact, both of these system exp~msions were studied m 1984, before construcaon begum on the starter system (Sacramento Bee, 1984b) Ctwc and business interests often perceive modem rml transR as adthng soplustlcauon to the commumty and providing the extra traffic capacity to downtown tha( eases future congesuon and allows more growth m office space Anne Rudm, heavily involved m LRT pJanmng and deostons from the outset, saw hgbt rad as "representing good urban hfe m Sacramenlo" (Sacramento Bee, 1983e) , helping to create % colorful, busthng downtown" (Sacramento Umon, i985) , by "a~tracang shops, malls and restaurants " (Sacramento Bee, 1983a) Other pubhc officaals and pro-transit groups shared her senuments (Isenberg, 1984 , Connelly, 1984 Hagedorn, 1984 , Hu]tgren, 1984 , 1985a , Colhn, 1985 , Modem TransR Society, 1978 Voters m 1979 rejected a 0 25% extra sales tax to pecked Thus, even though research suggests that new rad transit affects land use changes only under the most auspicious circumstances, there are enough caveats and uncertmntms that analysts and lay persons alike would not be wrong to clalm potential land use benefits from Sacramento's LRT As of early 1986, over $I 5 million had been committed by private landowners near statlons for "joint developments" to increase access to their bmldmgs *Lave (1978) and Hamer (1976, p 28) have demonstrated that rad transit ts tess energy efficient than buses (anrd even some recent-model autos) and that ~t increases braiding m CBDs, resulting m more auto trips m the CBD, wMch lowers mr quality 469 support RT bus servlce, by 56% (for) to 44% (against), less than the two-thuds majority reqmred m Cahforma to approve new local taxes (Schuman and Nelson, 1982, p 23) . Perhaps pohtioans see LRT as capable of gaming fiscal support through such a dedicated local tax m the future (there are incidental references to the posstbthty that both HOV and LRT w~ll need a dedicated local tax m the DEIS at pp 4-191 and 4-192) 
Other pohncal mouvatwna
Polmclans have httle reason to oppose LRT mvestments, and many reasons to support them~even more so now than m the 1960s and 1970s. Through the nud-1970s, the new generanon of raft transit technology was sull untested and therefore of unknown rehabzhty The ~mttal modem rml transit technologies (e g., hght raft m Boston, heavy rml the San Franclsco region) indeed were unrehable and ~usufiably cnt~o_z~d. At the same V_me, there had been expectations that raft transit would reduce, even chromate the growing operating cost defiats of mass transit.
By the 1980s, raft truant technology was no longer new or nsky; ~t had been ~mproved and was fatrly rehable. The earher cost performance expectat~om had d~solved; masave operating deficits were accepted as the new reality. As a result of improved teclmologw.al performance and dunm~hed expcctauons of financial performance, future rad transtt projects are unhkely to be perceived poht~caUy as fealures Rad transR ts hkely to enhance the unage of pohUc~ans who support tt, both during and after thetr tenure m office,, although extreme chsasten, perhaps mclu&ng the M~anu Metro, may turn out to be excepaons § The mterests and perspeeuves of local poliucal leaden tend to place them m support of real projects. They observe that rail transit projects are vmwed as posmve along most d~mens~ons by d~vene constituencies they appeal to business and environmental interests, transibdependent travelers, and to the general cav~c pride of residents The Sacramento hght real project has enjoyed broad pubhc support A survey in 1984 showed that about 63% of respondents m the city and the county supported LRT (Sacramento Bee, 1984c) A 1983 poll had showed 61% m favor (Sacramento Bee, 19830 More impressively, the support has been remarkably broad At the 1981 City Council meeting endorsing LRT, Mayor Phil Eisenberg enthused that it was "the only government proposal that had such a w~de variety of support from people who normally *In personal interviews, though, officaais (perhaps selfrighteously) claimed that LRTs most ardent supporters were not concerned wRh pohttcai advancement but were "genuinely conwnced by the merits of the project" (Gtanturco, 1985 , Colhn, 1985 We hypothesize, however, that the wider base of support ts premised on the low pohttcal risk to those individual pohttctans §Mlarm Metrorail has very low ndership (Dorschner, 1985) See footnote on page 468 do not even talk to each other" (Sacramento City Councal, 1981d) The Preferred Altematlve Report (SACOG, 1981, p 48) lists an unusually obverse group of supporters, from the Sierra Club to the Sacramento Board M Realtors. Public testimony at city (and, to a ! __espy__ extent, county) meetings was decidedly supporti~ and r, prtw~ntatwe of a vade range of interests (Sacramento City Council, 1977a , 1979a , 1979c .
Local officials credit the extraorchnary number of pubhc hearings (about 200) and the persistence and abthty of grassoroots pro-translt groups~mamly thẽ with galvan~ng public support and providing a sense that the decls|ons were well considered and well-backed Isenberg and Anne Rudm from the City Cotmcfl and Colhn and Ted Sheedy from the County emphasized that the LRT study was "exhaustive the most m depth ever done even overdone" (Sacramento City Council, 1977b , also Sacramento County Board of Supervisors, 1979b Isenberg, Colhn, Gianmrco, Connelly, the Sacramento Bee and the Sacramento Umon acknowledged that without the efforts of the MTS, there may have been no LRT (Sacramento City Council, 1981d , ColIm, 1985 C~anturco, 1985 , Sacramento Bee, 1983c , 1983d Sacramento Umon, 1978) Mrs members [obbmd heavily at public heanngs, often presenting pubhc declara~ons of supporL and were censured by pohticians and planmng and transportation staff (Sacramento City Council, 1977a) Light rail detractors were few and far between. City Councilman Blain Fischer was a consistent o1> ponent, asserting that light raft will go only "to nice areas where people have cars" (Sacramento City Council, 1978b) , to the neglect of the poor and that the romance with light rall "will end in divorce" because of "terrific upkeep costs" (Sacramento City Council, 1981d , Sacramento Bee, 1981a A number of individuals and businesses that stood to benefit from the 1-80 bypass opposed dropping it, but most of these were molhfied when the minor improvements they wanted were made anyway (Glanturco, 1985 , Hultgren, 1985a , Sacramento City Council, 1979b A few neighborhood groups felt that LRT would bnng m too many people and cars (which resulted in some stations being dropped in order to reduce opposition) (Sacramento Bee, 1982) , several individuals were concerned about pedestnan/LRT confhcts on the downtown K Street Pedestrmn Mall (Sacramento City Councal, 1981d , Sacramento Bee, 1981b One local columnist wrote against hght rml (Sacramento Umon, 1983 ) and RT's general manager in 1980 also opposed LRT (Sacramento Bee, 1980b) ,? but the local opposition was relatively insignificant
Local leaders see little hope of building new high-*This general manager opposed LRT and was fired, ostensibly for poor management practices The RT Board sought, and found, a new manager who supported LRT The DEIS was in progress dunng this period R A JOm~TON e~ a/ capacity artenals and freeways, such prelects are extremely expermve and would likely face detertinned opposition from affected neighborhoods. R would be a long and painful proc*~, pohtically and financially, to gain approval for a new freeway m built-up areas of the county now Even prelects such as new bridges face opposition from people who complain of the aestheUc impact on scemc vistas and the increases m neighborhood traffic On the other hand, as noted above, a hght rail project does not generate nearly as much opposition (ConneRy, 1984) It has the advantage that it occupies a narrow rightof-way In lower density non-CBD areas, there are often abandoned or htfle-u.~d railroad rights-of-way that can be used for raft transit. In the denser central city areas, hght raft may share the nght-of-way with vehicle traffic, someUmes m me&arts or shoulders separated from vehicles, at other umes sharing traffic lanes. LRT generally does not reqmre substanUal expropnauon of resldenUal land, chsplacement of people, or distcrbance of existing neighborhcxx~.,
CONCLUDING DL~2U~|ON
We ldenUfied five types of arguments that support LRT Even though m some cases they were based on mistaken local percepuon, of project effects, these are mo~vations typically ptu~ued by local leaders and cmzens groups striving to improve the mange of their city and to attract capital and to enhanc~ their pohucal standing There appears to be a worldwide perceptton that modem rall tra~t ts a low-risk, highprofile, public works investment that bestows prestige on the local area (see Sperhng, 1981) . Sacramento, dwarfed in size and sophistication by the Los Angeles and Oakland/San Francisco metropohtan areas, seeks that prestige § Our findings agree with those of Lupo et a/ (1971) in their examination of U S transportation politics They found that rail "transit extensions tend to be jusUfied m terms of what they will do to land use along their route" (p 201), and that "other motivations sometimes enter into the design of transit plans One 'other motivation' is to reduce the need for unpopular additional htghways A second is the doubtful assumptmn that expansion of rap~d transxt systems will result in a reduction of the transit deficit" (p 202) Leaders in Sacramento and other metropolitan areas hesttate to look too closely at the likely financial, environmental, and transportation effects of deploying rail transit They know rail transit (especially hght rail transit) ~s an infrastructure investment that ts realizable, they sense it ~s not a "bad" investment ,Only three businesses and eight dwellings were demolished (Roherts and Kershaw, I985. p 5) §Supervisor Colhn declared that with the advent of LRT. Sacramento "would not be a cowtown anymore" (Colhn, 1985) John Schumann asserted that Sacramento warrants LRT because it "IS no longer just a valley town" (Sacramento Bee, 1983b ) (See also Sacramento Bee, I984c Po|R1cs and technical unceFtamP¢ tn transpo~ation investment m that tt wall provade a level of servlce roughly comparable to bus transit A transit investment of $130 or $160 n,alhon for an area the stze of Sacramentõ s not excepuonal. Sewage treatment plants may cost $200 tmlhon or more and urban freeways may cost $50 mflhon or more per rode m metropoh of thus s~ze Indeed, the LRT project was intended to replace (cost-vase) only a 5 I rmle strasghtenmg of an erdstmg freeway LRT m Sacramento ts marganal m what sl offers, but ~t ts also a marganal investment increment to the transportatson and infrastructure base Chven the constraints on funding new transportataon unprovements and the favorable unage of rad trartstt, t ts not surpnsmg that cat~es close thezr ears to cntw~sm from funding agencaes and clamor for new raft transtt projects l~ecornmendat~ons concerning transst evaluation Thts revaew of the Sacramento LRT expenence shows that the evaluation of transst alternatwes by UMTA suffered senous shortcormngs The first problem was the lack of consideration of all vahd local concerns m the evaluation The federal and state transportatton planners revolved charactertzed many of the local concerns as "pohtscal " The local officaals, however, felt strongly that many ~mportant c onstderatmns were underemphasized tn the transR evaluation The second problem m the Sacramento transtt evaluataon was the lack of concern for uncertainty m the projections (Ascher, 1979) Recent history mchcates st ts very difficult to make accurate projectmns. One cannot confidently model mode chotce decasmns and accurately project transit ndershlp, much less specafy the long-term effects of transit deployment on land use, economic development, and envtronmental quahty These two problems, local relevance and techmcal accuracy, interact In Sacramento, the uncertauntaes ,n the analys~s were so large that a convmcang case for or against ratl transtt could not be made on narrow cost-effecnveness grounds The past use of an ,~rbltrary 10% "mystique" nderstup factor by UMTA (m Portland) dlustrates the mabdtty to forecast demand and evaluate performance rehably The fazlurẽ to specafy uncertainty sn the forecasts weakened the ,=e&bthty of the study Local poht~ctans and RT officials focussed their attention on total O&M costs, the single techmcal measure by wluch LRT was found supenor, yet there was httle recogmtmn of the uncertainty of that projectton m the documents Indeed, the small O&M advantage for LRT was, as demonstrated m flus paper, arrived at through bmsed assumptions The O&M costs for LRT and HOV were not s~gmficantly dtfferent, even ~f the LRT figure was corrected However, Wddavsky and Tenenbaum (1981) note that, "
where the poht~cal arena ts polarized, small &fferences among estimates are magmfied ff partacapants feel they have a stake m the esttmates" (p 229) That observation was vwsdly illustrated m Sacramento 471 Uncertain performance measures were used by UMTA to create a false &stmctaon System productivity measures are usually framed as total annual cost per nder or per new nder Raderslup ts difficult to forecast, however Raft systems recently com. pleted m North Amenca have actual nderslups that range from 89% below to 13% above predtcted levels (see footnote on page 468) Local officaals saw the UTMA staff as being pohttcal m asserting that HOV was supenor on the basts of total cost per passenger, when the projecuons differed by only about 11% (see Table 1) How then can transportation agencaes ~mprove thesr evaluation methods so that uncertainty ~s acknowledged and the ~mportant values of local interest groups are considered 9 UMTA ts adwsory to Congress Congress and sts corrumttees generally show concern for both natmnal efficaency and for local desires m their decision-malting It seems to us that UMTA can have more influence on transtt funding decisions ff tt incorporates legtttmate local concerns into ~ts evaluataons and tf tt acknowledges uncertainty m all of ~ts performance and ~mpact proJections.
We beheve that there can be vahd local concerns beyond system performance Local groups may pre&ct nataonal efficaency gains not included m the normal UMTA efficiency cntena. Local pnde ~s an example of a nonmarket benefit that could be larger wRh LRT than wtth HOV m an alternalaves analysts of a comdor Amemty values have long been recogmzed as nauonal eflicaency gums m economacs (see Fisher, 1981 , for a review) Another welfare gum under LRT m a comdor study could be the greater reductaon m d~esel fumes m the CBD These natmnal effictency effects should be counted m a transit evaluation, at least to &stmgu~sh among alternauves that are a tte on system performance cntena We do not consider some of the local concerns noted m the previous section as legitimate evaluatton entena, including the local max~mtzat~on of federal and state grant momes and the enhancement of pohttcal careers Nevertheless, we conclude that there were vahd local concerns that were not included m the evaluation Scholars have long suggested that local concerns be formally evaluated m water project planning (Bromley, et al, 1971) Th~s problem was officially recogmzed tn water resources planmng by Senate Document 97 m 1962 and m the Water Resources Councal's 1973 Pnncaples and Standards for plan and project evaluation Thts system exphcttly recommends the evaluation of nonmarket econonuc benefits and costs, such as envaronmental quahty and socml well-being, as well as tra&taonal components of national econorruc efhcaency
In transportation planmng, malor offietal stu&es have produced broad evaluatton frameworks that take local concerns into account (see Manhe~m, et al, 1971) The OECD (1976) states that, "cost-benefit analysts ~s an ~mportant part of the decaston mak-mg process but is insufficient and cannot replace the role of the decmon maker " (p m) An overvmw of pohUcaUy relevant urban development pohcy evaluation methods is provlded by L~tcl~eld et aL (1975) . Johnston (1977) , for instance, found that the evahm~on criteria for the t~rd London Airport study were narrowly confined to aggregate performance indicators, against which the alternatives did not vary slgn~cantiy, and that much more ira= portant project impacts were ignored Concern for these other impacts ts often expressed In polmcal declssonmakmg Wddavsky and Tenenbaum (1981) , m a study of U S energy pohcy, state that," more often than not data have prescribed the outer hmtts of agreement but, within the arena, politics have dominated data" (p 308) We argued in the Introductmn that such dlslnbutlonal pohtacs ss normal m the Umted States What we need for the evaluauon of major transit investments, then, is a system that glves primary weight to performance criteria but that invokes adchtional le~mnate local cntena when alternatives are fairly close on these cost-effecnveness prolec~ons.t UMTA recently adopted a revised system for evaluating transit investments (~A 1984a (~A , UMTA 1984b Tlus method uses techmcal performance proje~ons to prescribe '°the outer hunts of agreement," but also allows local pohtical conslderat~ons to figure prominently, wltlun those bounds. UMTA faces the same problem with Congress as st did with the Sacramento City Council the evaluanon system needs to be technically sound, while not relying too heawly on shaky technical prolectlons, and must be broad enough to include legmmate welfare concerns not represented m techmcal measures but raised by local officials While UMTA's evaluation procedure used to analyze LRT m Sacramento faded these tests, the subsequently adopted method appears to be more acceptable as a pohcy evaluation tool
The UMTA system uses two performance threshold tests to ehminate "clearly unattractive proposals" (UMTA 1984b, p 3) Before entering alternatives analysis, a comdor must have at least 15,000 dady hnked tranm tnps and the tranm mode must have a total annual cost per new nder of $I0 O0 or less (for 1985 funding proposals) These two screenmg criteria are not very restncuve and are dessgued to cut off only very inefficient projects early m the funding process
To pass from alternatives analysts into preliminary engmeenng, projects must pass three addmonal performance threshold tests (1) transst ndership must be proposed to increase as a result of the investments, (2) the preferred alternative must be the least expensive alternatwe at that level of ndership, and (3) the project must have a total annual cost per new nder of $6 00 or less (for I985 proposals) The cost per new rider constraint ts lowered from the $10 00 used m the first screemng to reflect the greater certainty of the more complete studies, at tl~s stage It ss still not a very restrictive constraint, however At both screening stages, projects are only loosely ranked according to the techracal measures into h~gh, moderate, and low categories. Witban these categories, projects are not &scretely ranked, due to techmcal uncertainty tn the projections For example, total annual costs of $1 50 and $I 70 per new rider "are conssdered indistinguishable" (13% difference) (UMTA 1984b, p 17) Further ranking w~thm the three categories ss carresd out "iudgementally." Tins rating rehes primarily on the degree of local financial comnuttment and, to a lesser degree, on the adoptaon of appropriate local land use and CBD parking policies.
Wtule the I984 UMTA evaluation system is mtended for annual, cwy-to-ctty (new start) project comparisons, it also apphes to evaluating alternatsves m one city, as when interstate transfer funds are to be spent. It appears that ff this evaluation method had been apphed in 1981 and 1982 to the evaiuauon of LRT in Sacramento, the evaluation would have concluded that HOV and LRT @ere mdmtmguishable m terms of total cost per passenger (11% difference), O&M cost per passenger (2% difference), and to~ O&M cost (4% d~erenee) (Table 1), Instead of the federal and state transportauon officials pointing to the total cost per passenger projections (favoring HOV) and the local officials espo~mg the total O&M cost projecUons (favonng LRT) and argtung past each other, everyone could have agreed that these two alternatives were a tm on these criteria and moved on to other criteria, such as local pride and pohtical support for implementation
The new UMTA transit evaluauon method adrmts to techmcal uncertainty, which increases its political acceptability and its scientific validity It also leaves room for the value of local pohtlcal effort, mcreasmg itS appeal to local officials and to Congress Local pohtlcal "support," per se, is not given much weight by UMTA, however The UMTA political criteria do reward local pohtscians, however, for taking ac* tions to enhance future transit system performance Once their project is in the top general class of projects, local offacials can advance its rank by increasing the local finanacial capital contribution, adopting a dedicated funding source for O&M, enacting suppomve zoning policies around stations, and restrictmg CBD parking These criteria which reward concrete local action may serve to direct local pohticat energies into system amprovement, rather than into futile disagreements over performance projections -tSuch a method technically can be classified as "sausficmg combined with lexlcography" (Mac Cnmmon, 1968) ,The Sacramento evaluation relied on total cost per rider, rather than total cost per new nder, as UMTA now does We ignore this and other problems (the 15,000 daily hnked trips constraint and the mcreasmg ndersMp constrains) m applying the 1984 UMTA evaluauon method to our case We will cnuque the details of the UMTA evaluation policy m a subsequent article Poht~cs and techmcal uncertam~ m trm~ponauon investment The Sacramento exl~nence shows the need for such evaluation system
